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Abstract This article takes a retrospective look at experience with limited entry
licensing, with particular attention to events of the past decade since the Powell River
Conference of 1978. The perspective is set by reviewing some of the issues raised
early on in these programs' histories. This is followed with a synthesis of some of the
important trends and characteristics of limited entry license programs. Finally, some
speculative thought is offered regarding fitture directions for limited entry license
programs and their roles in fisheries management.
Introduction
A decade ago fisheries management was at an important crossroad. Throughout the
world, many of the most important fisheries had been drastically overharvested by the
large fleets of domestic and foreign vessels that fished the waters adjacent to coastal
nations. Fishing incomes were generally low and fisheries managers were frustrated by
their inability to control effort and harvests. Beginning in 1976, the institutional struc-
ture for marine resources management was suddenly and radically altered as coastal
nations claimed jurisdiction out to 200 miles. This single institutional reform opened up
a whole new range of management options and set in motion forces for major change in
fisheries management.
It was in this setting that a small conference was convened in 1978, primarily to
assess some new programs and to speculate over fisheries management options into the
next decade. The Powell River Conference had an agenda focused on what were then
some recent and revolutionary experiments in fisheries management, namely, limited
entry licensing and buyback programs (see Proceedings in the Journal of Fisheries
Research Board of Canada 1979). There was a sense of seriousness lent to the debates,
as if the outcomes of the discussions might actually determine which of several paths
fisheries management might take over the immediate future. By the close of the confer-
ence, however, there was little general agreement over several critical issues, and partic-
ipants looked anxiously to the next decade to see how these new programs would unfold.
Limited Entry Licensing—Early Assessments
At the time that the Powell River Conference was convened in 1978, there were only a
handful of limited entry experiments to assess, including: Rock Lobster and Prawn
Fisheries in Australia (initiated 1968); salmon programs in British Columbia (initiated
1968), in Alaska (initiated in 1974), and in Washington (initiated 1974); and the roe
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herring program in British Columbia (initiated in 1974). One of the first important points
that surfaeed during the diseussion of events leading up to limited entry programs was
that the objectives of various programs were generally different. Whereas in all cases the
principal impetus for change was impending crisis, what constituted "crisis" was differ-
ent to different people. In particular, whereas economists saw "too many boats chasing
too few fish" as an economic problem, biologists saw exactly the same phenomenon as a
biological threat to species protection. In nearly all of these early cases, fisheries man-
agers rather than economists were instrumental in pushing for limited entry, not to arrest
rent dissipation, but to maintain control over harvest in the face of increasing power.
This was most surely the case in Alaska and Washington, and in the Australian fish-
eries.'
Significantly, it was only in the British Columbia salmon fishery that the prime
motive was initially one of addressing the economic consequences of overcapacity. The
events that led up to the implementation of licensing in this case are instructive. As early
as the 1940s, the province's major fisheries union urged license limitation as a method of
ensuring "a decent livelihood" for British Columbian fishermen and shoreworkers
(Morehouse 1972). This kernel of political support was cultivated by provincial politi-
cians at various times, and in 1956 a commission was drawn up in which a limited entry
plan was devised and circulated. This Sinclair Report clearly had economic rationaliza-
tion as a mandate,^ but diverse opposition to the specifics of the plan stalemated adoption
until 1968. In that year two events crystallized to force adoption. The first was the
Liberal party victory in national parliamentary elections and the second was the election
of Jack Davis to the position of Minister of Fisheries. Davis was a Westerner thoroughly
familiar with the salmon fishery and also an economist well versed in the concepts
associated with economic rationalization. These sympathies, together with the rather
special ability to issue Orders in Council, allowed the program to be initiated quickly
and despite the objections of the industry.
Given the uniqueness of the British Columbian program, it should not be surprising
that there was considerable excitement and anticipation over what was unfolding by
1978. By that date there were a few other programs in existence, but it was British
Columbia's that was most clearly an economic experiment. The picture that emerged in
this case and rapidly in all of the others was quite similar. The most obvious lesson was
that simple limited entry licensing alone was not very effective in freezing either finan-
cial capital or physical fishing capacity in these fisheries. In one analysis of British
Columbia's salmon fleet value, it was found that although growth in real fieet value
(exclusive of license values) was slowed, it was still significant after adoption of limited
entry (Pearse and Wilen 1979).
With respect to fishing capacity, the British Columbia experience also immediately
revealed a rapid erosion of simple effort controls as fishermen found ways to circumvent
regulations by expanding the "free" dimensions of effort. In die British Columbia expe-
rience, the result was a series of regulation changes as managers "chased" fishing effort
through several phases, including:
1. Initial limits in numbers of vessels; changed in 1970 (after 76 vessels of 186 tons
were replaced with new vessels of 596 tons capacity).
2. Limits of tonnage of vessels; allowed ton-for-ton replacement and prohibited
splitting larger licenses into more than one smaller license.
3. Limits on length of vessels; applicable to smaller vessels (less than 15 tons) for
which there were no registered tonnages. The effectiveness of length limits wasLimited Entry Licensing 315
skirted by new hull designs. After 1977 replacement vessels with "pyramided"
licenses (i.e., one vessel replacing two or more) could not be longer than 50 feet
in length.
4. Limits on gear types; prohibited converting gillnet or troll vessels into seines
from 1977 forward.
5. Limits on combining licenses, specifically ending the practice of pyramiding li-
censes (combining two or more small vessels into one large one).
Perhaps the most compelling question to arise out of this first evidence on limited entry
licensing was: can limited entry programs ever be successful in freezing capacity expan-
sion and generating sustainable rents? This question generated the most heated and
interesting debates at Powell River for obvious reasons. If, as some argued, such pro-
grams could effectively bind up capacity expansion, then it would be a relatively easy
policy to implement across the many fisheries that had suddenly come under single
nation jurisdiction in 1976. On the other hand, if an endless process of "effort chasing"
were in store, then even more radical institutional restructuring would be necessary in
order to achieve efficiency in fisheries.'
The debate over this issue separated into discussions over the correct paradigm and
over the correct interpretation of the empirical evidence, scant as it was. It quickly
became apparent that analysis was hampered by the absence of any theories of the
regulated fishery with which to predict what ought to unfold in a limited entry fishery.
Part of the problem was that H. S. Gordon's legacy was not rich enough to address some
of the issues emerging out of the British Columbian and other programs (Gordon 1954).
Gordon was among the first economists to analyze fisheries as common property re-
sources. His important prediction was that effort would be drawn into common property
fisheries until the value of average (rather than marginal) product of effort was equal to
marginal opportunity cost. At this point, potential rents would be completely wasted
(dissipated) through the use of excessive inputs. Unfortunately, whereas Gordon's para-
digm gave a straightforward prediction when there was only one input, it was not clear
what the multi-input analogue should be. This was clearly important because limited
entry programs could only hold one or a few inputs fixed. Without a theory of the
regulated fishery (in a multiple input setting), economists had little on which to base
predictions regarding the extent and nature of regulated rent dissipation (Wilen 1979).
The bulk of the discussion was devoted to interpreting what the evidence from the
few (relatively new) limited entry programs was revealing. In each of the programs,
licenses had apparendy taken on some values and this was interpreted by some as evi-
dence of rent generation. This interpretation was not accepted by all, however. First of
all, there were important measurement problems associated with the fact that several of
the programs disallowed trading of licenses, whereas others disallowed trade in licenses
exclusive of the vessels they were attached to. Second, where data on license values
could be pieced together, the markets appeared to exhibit somewhat anomalous behavior,
perhaps attributable to very immature markets. For example, licenses in all programs
immediately assumed values even though some fisheries were extremely overcapitalized
and near bankruptcy. In Washington State, licenses took on values even when entry was
not fully closed. In Alaska, license values increased steadily without any further policy
measures, whereas in British Columbia, salmon seine license values appeared also to
reflect herring rents (since many vessels fished for both). To some analysts, it was
unclear how much of the value of licenses was attributable to real as opposed to expected
rents in very youthful stages of various markets' development.316 J. E. Wilen
A more important focus of debate was over whether the erosion of effort control was
an inevitable consequence of limited entry and whether, in the longer run, limited entry
would be able to sustain rents. On one side of the argument were those who held to the
view that fishing technology is extremely flexible and that the (internal and external)
incentives for continued dissipation could not be contained. On the other side were those
who viewed fishing technology as essentially fixed proportions (i.e., a "platform on
which to hang gear"). If this were true, once a few key dimensions (length, width,
tonnage, etc.) were constrained, there would be few additional ways to waste rents.
Lastly, there were differing interpretations on the kinds of investments that were
taking place in the handful of limited entry fisheries. Some of these were felt to be
"comfort and safety" investments that signalled a more proprietary position ensured by
licensing programs. As a general summary view, it was felt by most discussants that
many of these issues were empirical questions, the answers to which would be revealed
with further experience. It was also noted that limited entry programs had not really
been "pushed" to test their rent generating potential; nearly all simply froze entry and
only British Columbia attempted a (quickly aborted) buyback program. Powell River
Conference participants thus looked anxiously at the future to reveal just how effective
limited entry policies might become and what their limitations might be.
License Limitation—A Retrospective Assessment
What new evidence has been provided by the accumulation of 10 more years of experi-
ence with limited entry? Although it is hazardous to generalize, several observations
seem pertinent to the issues raised at Powell River. To set the stage it is important to note
that fisheries have generally undergone at least some recovery from conditions of the
early 1970s. This has been largely a result of increased ability to control harvests off
coastal waters formerly targeted, at least in part, by foreign vessels. In addition, real fish
prices have risen as tastes have shifted toward health-conscious diets and as trade pat-
terns have realigned due to the extension of jurisdiction. Thus, by and large, there have
been more fish available and stronger markets over the past decade.
Under these conditions of general profitability, it is likely that substantial rents have
been generated in most limited entry fisheries. Partial evidence of this is in the prices
attained for limited entry licenses. British Columbian salmon seine licenses have fluctu-
ated over values as low as $500 per registered ton of vessel to values as high as $8,000
per ton over this past decade. British Columbian roe herring licenses currently sell for
over $500,000 for seine licenses and $80,000 for gillnet licenses. Norweigian purse
seine licenses are quoted upwards of $1,000,000 for a 6,000 hectoliter vessel (Hannes-
son 1986). In Alaska, prices for permits vary by gear and by region, but representative
values include: $175,000 for a drift gillnet in the Aleutian Peninsula; $250,000 for a
purse seine license for the same area; $325,000 for a Bristol Bay gillnet, etc. (Schelle
and Muse 1986). Whereas it may be questioned whether the markets for these limited
entry permits are "perfect," in the sense of correctly anticipating all future events, there
is little doubt that rents have been generated in most of these fisheries and persistently
refiected in license values. This has occurred even in programs with very limited con-
trols on capital (e.g., in Alaska the permits are on individuals) and at input levels close
to initial open access conditions.
On the other hand, it is also clear that the fundamental incentives to employ extra
measures to compete are latent, strong, quickly triggered, and basically unaffected byLimited Entry Licensing 317
T^blel



















































limited entry. Fishermen are quick to adopt any measures possible to gain a small, short-
lived edge, even when it is understood that when everyone adopts in the face of fixed
total harvests, costs simply rise. The hypothesis that much of the early vessel improve-
ments were for "comfort and safety" appears to be incorrect. When vessels are made
more seaworthy, it is less for safety and more to beat fellow fishermen to "outside"
fisheries and/or to enable fishing under adverse weather conditions. Similarly, practices
such as installing multiple units of electronic gear are not for redundancy to increase
safety but for rapid maneuvering under navigation during the frenzy of an opening."
It is also clear that economists' early focus on over capjfa/ization in the fisheries
economics literature drew attention away from other means of dissipating rents. Fisher-
men engage in a whole spectrum of decisions in a competitive environment with each
other, and just as there is no incentive to configure their vessels optimally, neither is
there reason to believe that these other decisions are efficient. One particularly important
"sink" for rent dissipation is in excess mobility and movement. During the buildup of
roe herring profits in the late 1970s, the fishery was transformed from one where the
fleet was spread over relatively longer openings in several areas to one where a signifi-
cant fraction of the fieet converged on each opening. As Table 1 shows, the number of
vessels participating in each area's fishery grew in a staggering fashion even though total
allowable catch dropped in most cases. The reason for this frenzied movement was that
prices and profits rose to such an extent' that near Klondike conditions occurred. At the
height of this management nightmare, gillnetters were being helicoptered from one
opening to another and capacity was so large on some grounds that openings were
reduced to 15 minutes.
Other fisheries reveal similar examples of rent dissipation by congestion and interfer-
ence on the grounds in day-to-day activities. For example, in the pink shrimp fishery off
the Pacific Coast, fishermen "search" for fishable concentrations over many known318 J. E. mien
shrimp beds up and down the coast (Eales and Wilen 1986). When concentrations are
heavy, fishermen quickly converge and repeatedly drag over the beds in a frenzied
manner. These activities cause the shrimp to disperse, thus driving catching costs up
until rents are dissipated. The important point in these two examples is that short-run
fishing, moving, and searching activities can be just as important as long-run capital
configuration decisions in dissipating potential rents. Economists have paid little atten-
tion to these dimensions of the problem.
These observations shed some light on the issue of the correct paradigm for regulated
fisheries. Most significant fisheries today fall under single nation or bilateral treaty
jurisdiction and are, in principle, biologically controllable via traditional methods, such
as closed seasons, closed areas, and gear restrictions. If we accept the assumption that
harvests can be held to some level by fisheries managers, then fisheries are, from the
perspective of each individual fisherman, essentially a game involving division of a fixed
pie. Fishermen compete with each other over individual shares of the pie and regulators
"compete" against the industry to ensure that the fishery is not overharvested (Wilen
1985, 1986). Under these circumstances, cost minimization over unregulated inputs is
an inappropriate hypothesis with which to predict either how much rent will be gener-
ated or what fishing technology will look like over time.
The lengthy history we have of regulated fisheries shows these two behavioral pro-
cesses at work in all fisheries. On the one side, fishermen are continually engaged in the
process of gaining an edge on their counterparts, either with long-term vessel configura-
tion changes and/or with short-term actions (ranging a spectrum including mobility and
movement, information gathering, sharing, bluffing, etc.). On the other side, regulators
are continually stifling any increases in aggregate fishing capacity with changes in sea-
son length, area closures, and gear restrictions. It is important to note that this process is
dynamic, interactive, and evolutionary, and is thus difficult to predict. To predict the
long term with this paradigm, we need to hypothesize something about regulators' be-
havior, and the best that can be said is that they seem to choose policies that minimize
deviations from some targeted aggregate harvest levels. A look at the specific mecha-
nisms in several fisheries reveals that managers generally find it easiest to shorten sea-
sons, and hence season length restrictions dominate policy instruments chosen. Mitigat-
ing against this, however, is the fact that shorter seasons require much more monitoring
and control, and hence become increasingly risky. Thus periodically regulators will
invoke other instruments (generally tighter terminal gear restrictions) to reduce fishing
effectiveness and (perhaps) enable the relaxing of season length restrictions.
What does this general paradigm tell us about what we should expect to happen in
limited entry fisheries over time? The last decade's experience reveals a wealth of case
study materials, which, at first glance, seems hard to synthesize. On the one hand, it is
clear that fisheries have been successfully controlled where managers have been willing
to employ the instruments of their disposal with enough vigor to combat increasing
effort. On the other hand, these traditional means of regulating fisheries have done
nothing to alter the incentives among fishermen to compete for shares of the fixed
resource.
In fisheries where these incentives have been allowed to operate unbridled, the uni-
versal results has been tighter and tighter biological controls and rising costs. Perhaps
the most instructive example of this tendency is in the Pacific Halibut fishery, a high-
valued, open access fishery that is currently on a razor's edge of control. What was once
prosecuted over a 9 month period is now completed in hours in a mass frenzy of activity.
Over the past several years the length of openings has hovered around 5 days, with anLimited Entry Licensing 319
enormous waste of potential rents. At one of this year's 24-hour openings in Alaska,
there were reports that 50% of the catch was delivered after never being on ice, 30%
was not even gutted, etc. The important lesson to arise out of this case (and others) is
that this process (if not the degree of current waste) is an inevitable result of the incen-
tives and interactions inherent in regulated fisheries. Conditions in the Pacific halibut
fishery are not anomalous but, in some sense, characteristic of the "Grand Equilibrium"
toward which all traditionally regulated fisheries open access will gravitate as real fish
prices rise. That others have not reached such extreme conditions yet is due only to their
relatively lower rents at this stage of their history.
To return to the critical issue raised 10 years ago, can limited entry programs bind up
these opportunities to compete so that rents can emerge and be sustained? As the PowU
River debates correctly predicted, an important determinant of the potential long-run
success of limited entry programs is the substitutability of inputs in fishing technology. If
technology is close to fixed proportions, it is reasonable to expect that constraining one
(or a few) critical dimensions will indeed bind up choices. On the other hand, if technol-
ogy is very fiexible, then constraints placed on one dimension of effort will be circum-
vented by changes in others. In hindsight it is probably safe to say that the fishing
process allows more substitution than was anticipated. This is the case for several rea-
sons including: (1) the boatbuilding industry has responded to constrained inputs by
innovating around them (induced innovation), and (2) there are numerous short- and
intermediate-term decisions that are also subject to the same incentives (e.g., mobility,
searching). Mitigating against these, however, is the fixity induced by the terminal gear
restrictions that are also in place in most modem fisheries. This important connection
was also overlooked 10 years ago; namely, that substitution possibilities on the vessel
are linked to and limited by terminal gear characteristics. When regulations bind up net
depth, length, and other gear characteristics, there are in many cases few further com-
petitive options to pursue.
In some sense, then, we have come full circle in this review. In 1976 many of the
world's important fisheries were in poor condition financially and biologically. The more
valuable fisheries that were controllable were severely restricted with short seasons and
often tight constraints on terminal gear. In this setting, more often than not the principal
support for limited entry came fi"om fisheries managers who saw it as a means of eliminat-
ing a significant avenue (entry) for fishing capacity increases. In the fisheries where
limited entry was adopted, these low-level equilibrium open access conditions set the
initial stage, which was then followed (after limiting entry) by relatively prosperous times.
During the past 10 years we have thus had good test conditions for limited entry policies.
Where limited entry programs have not been introduced, the results have been more of
the same process witnessed prior to 1976; namely, strong competition between fishermen
and "racing" to catch fish, redundant and inefficient investment, and increasingly severe
biological controls (e.g. the Halibut fishery). Where limited entry has been introduced, the
results have been some rents emerging in license values; substantial in some fisheries.
There has also been "slippage" in all fisheries as fishermen have found means to expand
capacity and as regulators have had to "chase" effort.
The degree to which rents have been generated and have been sustained appears to
depend in a complicated way on initial and later economic conditions, fishing technology,
and cumulative regulatory decisions. In fisheries where the terminal gear has been man-
dated to remain "primitive" (e.g., lobster and crab traps, salmon troll gear), the principal
"sinks" for rents have been somewhat limited, mainly in increased mobility and seawor-
thiness and a push toward outside or previously inaccessible stocks. With seine and gillnet320 J. E. Wilen
gear, the extent of vessel reconfigurations has been dictated by the stringency of the
terminal gear regulations. Other investments (in electronics, etc.) have taken place as well
as increases in mobility. To an important degree, then, some of the rents we see appearing
in license values may be mostly a function of the type of terminal gear restrictions in place
rather than input substitutability of vessel inputs per se. Thus the biologically determined
regulations in place at the beginning of limited entry programs and the subsequent se-
quence of follow-up changes may be the real determinants of patterns of rent generation
across regulated fisheries.
The irony in all of this is that rent creation and maintenance in today's limited entry
fisheries is still very unsystematic. It is not a result of cost saving and efficiency creating
actions on the part of fishermen but rather (still) a by-product of the struggle to increase
shares by fishermen and the desire to stifie potential effort by regulators. It is still the
case that the focus of economists' concerns (overcapitalization or excess financial capi-
tal) is decoupled from the focus of fisheries managers' concerns (excess physical fishing
capacity). Finally, the regulatory structure still reacts to the workings oif perverse incen-
tives, and these reactions determine rents as a side effect as opposed to using incentives
to create rents as a primary objective.
Limited Entry—The Next Generation of Refinement
If a central lesson emerges out of the past decade or two of limited entry experience, it is
that such programs have failed to tackle the basic incentives problem, more or less as
economists predicted. Conventional limited entry programs, although they may generate
rents indirectly, do nothing to encourage efficiency and cost saving. Moreover, such
programs do not, in themselves, eliminate excess inputs. Instead, once initiated, such
programs take on a (somewhat unpredictable) life of their own; namely, a pattern of
action and reaction by fishermen and regulators. The only political hope for buyback or
other effort elimination programs under these scenarios is for the limited entry program
to box itself into a comer as severe as what generated the program in the first place.
The primary way to break this pattern and help fishermen out of this race, or "in-
vestment treadmill," is to attack the cause rather than the symptoms of the problem with
management programs that change incentives. Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs)
have been suggested as one way of doing this. ITQs are not the only way to restructure
incentives, however. The other primary avenue is to reduce the numbers playing the
competitive "game" to an extent that makes coordinated group action a preferable
strategy from each individual's standpoint. This, in turn, may be possible in some fish-
eries by initiating a straightforward modification of limited entry licensing; namely, area
licensing. Under this policy option, limiting numbers of participants via a traditional
licensing program would be only a first step to eliminate entry pressure from outside the
fishery. Once numbers are frozen, the fishery could be subdivided into smaller individ-
ual fisheries, each containing a fraction of the individual fieet and total quota. Moving to
this second stage should in principle make everyone better off on average since average
catch can be maintained and excess movement costs reduced.
The applicability and benefits to be gained from area licensing depend upon the
fishery, but the potential is very high in fisheries such as herring and salmon where
spawning occurs across widely dispersed areas. It is conceivable, in fact, to move these
fisheries very close to "privatization," where small groups of fishermen effectively own
rights to fish in certain spawning areas and very controlled fisheries take place only at
river mouths (for returning salmon) or specific spawning beds (for returning herring). In
salmon fisheries, in particular, this would reverse the process that has evolved out of theLimited Entry Licensing 321
race to catch fish, namely, the push toward "outside" fishing over mixed stocks, which
makes tailoring escapement to individual runs nearly impossible.
The principal barrier to a limited entry/area licensing program is the uncertainty it
engenders among fishermen. In the same sense that the freedom to costlessly enter an
open access fishery is viewed as important to fishermen, so is the freedom to move from
area to area viewed as important. The reason that fishermen need to move from area to
area, however, is partly a result of the regulation structure that has evolved. In the
current system in several fisheries, many fishermen move over many areas and fish in
highly frenzied openings for short periods of time. As the British Columbian herring
fishery revealed, as prices rise, this movement can become very frantic and may in-
crease the variability and uncertainty associated with each fisherman's catch. An area
licensing scheme would effectively slow this whole process down, by having each fish-
erman concentrate on fewer areas, under less frantic conditions with fewer competitors,
and over longer periods in each area. Since the same amount (or even larger) total catch
would be available, average catch per vessel would not be changed. The costs of fishing
and management difficulties would be drastically reduced, however.
The main example of an important fishery where area licensing has been initiated is
British Columbia's roe herring fishery. As has been documented amply elsewhere, this
fishery has gone through a classic pattern of overcapitalization, limited entry, and grad-
ual erosion of management control (Fraser 1980; MacgiUivray 1986; Wilen 1981). In
1981 managers were faced with the dilemma of managing a high capacity fieet in the
face of a decline in potential sustainable harvest. Conditions over the previous few
seasons were bordering on management nightmares; in many cases frantic movement of
vessels occurred between openings so that large fractions of the fieet were showing up at
each staggered opening. In several instances this necessitated extremely short openings
(one set or 15 minutes) and in others the fishery had to remain closed because of the
TAC/capacity mismatch.
After consultations with industry groups prior to the 1981 season, herring managers
adopted an area licensing scheme, splitting up the British Columbian fishery into three
areas. Fishermen were allowed to fish in only one area, thereby reducing the overcapac-
ity problem on each of the grounds by up to two-thirds. Since 1981 the area selection
process has changed somewhat, but the basic procedure involves aggregate quotas being
announced in each area prior to the season and fishermen jockeying around their first
choice selections prior to a preannounced date. Fishermen may hold licenses to fish
more than one area with a single vessel and, as Table 2 shows, there has been a move
toward this.
By nearly all standards this program is very successful. Management pressure is eased
due to the reduction in capacity in each area. In addition, a surprising number of fishermen
view the system as an improvement. Response to a repeated questionnaire including "do
you think that area licensing should continue?" revealed that by 1983, 86 percent of the
gillnetters and 78 percent of the seiners answered yes.
The interesting conceptual feature of area licensing is that it nudges incentives in the
right direction by changing the numbers playing the (rent dissipation) game. In the initial
experiments with limited entry, it was hoped that over time fishery-wide buyback pro-
grams might be instituted in order to reduce excess inputs. The past decade has shown that
to be difficult, particularly when there are large numbers of fishermen initially involved.
The same ends can be achieved with area licensing, however, and perhaps much easier, for
by reducing numbers in each area, it becomes easier to gain consensus in each area-
specific group over further efficiency-enhancing policies. Ultimately, at322 J. E. Wilen
Table 2
Multiple License Use in the British Columbian Herring Fishery
Total licenses
Vessels with 1 license
Vessels with 2 licenses





























some point as numbers are reduced, it becomes obvious to each group that controlled
and coordinated harvesting is superior to a frenzied race to individually maximize shares
of the (area) quota. At that point the fishery will convert to essentially an optimally
managed "privatized" fishery, with excess inputs retired and fishing operating on a
pooled-decision profit maximizing basis. It is conceivable, in fact, that each group could
share in the stock assessment and harvest target for "their" area since it would be in
their interest to operate with the long term in mind.
Whereas much of this is speculative at present, there is scattered evidence that area
licensing is a very viable alternative in some fisheries, perhaps preferable to other
measures such as ITQs, in fact. The British Columbian roe herring case has been suc-
cessful as have a few cases implemented in newly developed fisheries off Australia and
New Zealand where initial numbers were relatively small. It is not clear, however,
whether the critical threshold, which begins to induce cooperative behavior in an area
group, is small (5-10) or moderately large (50-75). There is much anecdotal evidence
even in traditional limited entry fisheries that fishermen will revert to cooperative behav-
ior when numbers are small enough and the gains are clearly evident. In the British
Columbian herring fishery, for example, seine fishermen have agreed to "pool" in
several instances where the capacity exceeded the stock's ability to withstand even one
whole-fieet opening. Similarly, in Alaska's roe herring fishery this year, a group of
about 40 vessels decided to consolidate and prosecute a particularly difficult opening
with a pool of 10 vessels. These examples demonstrate that when numbers are small
enough, both the benefits from and the possibilities for group profit maximizing behav-
ior become more evident to participants.
Area licensing schemes are thus variants of limited entry programs that deserve more
consideration, perhaps as a natural extension of existing programs. As experience with
standard limited entry programs has shown, it is virtually impossible to fight the basic
incentives inherent in a regulated fishery where large numbers of participants compete
with fiexible technology for a share of a valuable pie. The last 10 years has demon-
strated, in fact, that rents can be sustained mainly where the fishing technology is
relatively primitive and/or where terminal gear restrictions bind up the substitution pos-
sibilities. The attractive feature of area licensing is that it alters the basic incentives
guiding fishermen and thereby changes the decision-making process. By reducing the
size of the group within which each fisherman competes, the prospects for more orderlyLimited Entry Licensing 323
and coordinated hehavior become greater. If numbers in each group could be reduced
enough, in fact, a fishery could more or less automatically convert into several "privat--
ized" fisheries in which costs and management problems are substantially reduced.
Notes
1. Other goals were important as well. In Alaska, there was some hope that limited entry
would restrict entry by non-Alaskans. In Washington, limited entry was a reaction to the manage-
ment crisis induced by the Boldt decision, which gave native Americans half of the targeted
salmon catch. In the British Columbian roe herring fishery, there was concern that management
difficulties might accelerate (as they had in salmon), and limited entry was intended to forestall
this.
2. The Terms of Reference stated "(r)educed to its simplest form, the problem to be resolved
was this: how can salmon and halibut fisheries as currently administered provide a decent standard
of living for all those engaged in e industry?" (see Sinclair 1962, p. 306).
3. The answer to this question was of more than idle academic curiosity since several of its
discussants had been involved with bruising struggles to get even simple changes made in fisheries
policy in the 1950s and 1960s. To many of these discussants, fishermen were thought to be
particularly intransigent and the prospects for promoting restructuring any more complicated than
simple limited entry were looked on with considerable skepticism.
4. Many salmon seine vessels have two loran (radar navigation) units (at $20,000 each)
installed; one on the bridge and one in the wheelhouse. The reason given by fishermen for this
expensive redundancy is that a few seconds missed during a frantic opening could result in a lost
net set; hence having units close by in different parts of the boat is worth the investment. When all
fishermen do this, of course, there is no gain; costs simply rise for everyone.
5. Roe herring prices increased from around $500 per ton in 1974 to over $3,500 per ton in
1979.
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